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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16840

MICHAEL JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of public
intoxication under Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, 1965, §32-1-4, and appeals on the grounds that
said ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face,
and seeks a dismissal of the charge against him.
II
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
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Lake County, State of Utah, entered a Minute Entry on
December 10, 1979, and presented a final order on
December 21, 1979, ruling against the Appellant on
his appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Salt Lake
County from the guilty judgment therein.
III
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the order denying his
Motion to Dismiss, a declaratory judgment that the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, §32-1-4
is unconstitutionally vague on its face, and a
dismissal of the criminal action against the Defendant
herein.

IV
STATEMENT OF CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 23, 1978, the Defendant-Appellant,
herein referred to as "appellant", was arrested in
front of his home by the Salt Lake City Police Department for the offense of public intoxication.

On

December 26, 1978, the Plaintiff-Respondent filed a
criminal Complaint against the Appellant in the Court
below alleging a violation of the Revised Ordinances
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of Salt Lake City, 1965, §32-1-4.

On January 9, 1979,

the Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging
that the ordinance under which Appellant was charged
was and is unconstitutionally vague.

The lower Court

entered an Order denying the Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss on May 3, 1979, and on May 3, 1979, the
Appellant duly reserved his right to appeal the issue
by filing a timely Notice of Preservation of Right to

Appeal.

On May 14, 1979, the Appellant was found

guilty on the charge.

The Appellant filed a timely

Notice of Appeal on the denial of his Motion to
Dismiss.

On December 10, 1979, the Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah entered a Minute Entry ruling against the
Appellant on this appeal.

Apparently, the Court did

not have access to the Reply Memorandum and the Request for Oral Arguments in this matter prior to the
Court's ruling on December 10, 1979.

Upon request,

the Third Judicial District Court allowed oral
arguments on December 21, 1979.

At the conclusion of

the oral arguments, a final order was presented which
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
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v
ARGUMENT
§32-1-4 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE
CITY, 1965, IS IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE
The crime of which the Defendant was charged in
the above captioned matter was the crime of violating
§32-1-4 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
1965, hereinafter referred to as "the ordinance."
The ordinance provides as follows:
"No person shall drink liquor in a public
building, park or stadium or be in an
intoxicated condition in a public place."
The Defendant concedes the constitutionality of
the first part of the ordinance which provides that
"no person shall drink liquor in a public building,
park or stadium ... ," as being a permissible exercise
of the police power and as being sufficiently clear
so as to afford notice of what acts constitute a
violation of the ordinance sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process set forth in the United
States Constitution.
The second part of the ordinance, which provides
that"[no person shall] be in an intoxicated condition
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in a public place",is in violation of the United States
Constitution in that it is vague on its face and
therefore denies due process to those accused of or
found guilty of its violation.
It is a cardinal rule of constitutional law that
all statutes and ordinances must meet a certain
criteria of clarity before they may be enforced.

The

United States Supreme Court has reasoned that an
arrest or conviction under a statute which does not
afford the accused adequate notice of what acts do
and do not constitute a violation of that statute is a
denial of due process.

Papachristou v. City of

Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, 92 S.
Ct. 839 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
83 L. Ed. 888, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939); Connally v.
General Construction Co. 269 U.S. 385, 70 L. Ed. 322,
46 S. Ct. 126 (1926).

The Court in Lanzetta noted for

example:
. . No one may be required at peril of
life, liberty or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes. All are
entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids. The applicable
rule is stated in Connally v. General
Construction Co. "That the terms of a
penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those
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who are subject to it what conduct on their
part will render them liable to i.ts
penalties, is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of
fair play and the settled rules of law.
And a statute ·which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law."
(footnotes ommitted)
In the instant case, the Defendant was charged
with being in an intoxicated condition in a public
place.

Black's ·Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition,

defines the word "intoxicated" as "affected by an
intoxicant, under the influence of an intoxicating
liquor."

The citation in Black's Law Dictionary

for that definition is Taylor v. Joyce, 4 Cal. Ap.
No. 2 page 612, 41 P. 2d 967, 968 (1935).
In defining "intoxication", the Courts have
attempted to provide the meaning of that term.

In

doing so, cases hold that the term "intoxication" is
commonly understood by "a person of ordinary intelligence".

However, when the Court in each of these

cases defines the term "intoxication", several
significantly different interpretations arise, both
between themselves and with the definition of the
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term established in Black's Law Dictionary.

See,

Findlay v. Tulsa, Okl. Cir., 561 P. 2d 980 (1977);
Quittner v. Thompson, 309 F. Supp. 684 (1970);
Clowney v. State, Fla. 102 So. 2d 619 (1958);
McArthur v. State, Fla. 191 So. 2d 429 (1966); and
State V. Painter, 134 S. E. 2d 638 (1964).

The mere consumption of a small amount of liquor
may cause a person "to be affected by the intoxicant."
And this is true no matter how minimal the effect or
the influence.
The determination of what constitutes "public
intoxication" is a determination of degrees.

Clearly,

only in extraordinary cases, would a person that has
consumed one beer be arrested for public intoxication,
and clearly only in extraordinary cases, would a
person that has consumed a fifth of whiskey not be
arrested for public intoxication.

The problem area

is between the one beer consumer and the one fifth
consumer.

Who makes the determination as to which

persons are arrested from this category?

The police

officer on the street, and what criteria does he use?
His own "common knowledge" of what a drunk is and
does, without any clear objective standards from the
statute.
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The Utah State Legislature has, by establishing a
plan for the distribution of alcohol to adults in the
State of Utah, indicated an intent that consumption of
alcohol in Utah by adults under certain conditions
shall be a lawful activity.

The conduct proscribed

by the ordinance of appearing in public after consumption of a minimal amount of alcohol should not be
deemed a criminal offense.
The ordinance provides no notice to citizens of
Salt Lake City of what conduct is declared illegal.
Given the above-described policy of the Utah legislature, that adults may drink alcoholic beverages
within the state, a citizen might assume that it is
legal to appear in public after consuming a small
amount of alcoholic intoxicant.

Given the ordinance,

a citizen might assume that at some level of intoxication
or at some level of disorderly or dangerous conduct,
one who is intoxicated in public has violated the
ordinance.

But the ordinance does not make clear

that some minimal level of intoxication is permissi_hle
in public in Salt Lake City, and does not give any
indication of what level of intoxication or standard
of conduct is a violation of the ordinance.
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The ordinance leaves too much discretion to
arresting officers to determine what level of intoxication or what quality or conduct renders a person
in violation of the ordinance.

That is an extra-

ordinary subjective evaluation of another human beingwith plenty of room for error.

Even if one comes in

contact with another person who, for example, lacks
a continuity of thought or of ideas, the ability of
one person to know simply on that basis-without any
other objective evaluation-that the other person acts
in that manner totally because his brain is so far
affected by potations of intoxicating liquor, is
simply beyond the realm of ordinary, realistic
human capability.

This discretion leaves the door

open for harassment by police officers of members of
certain groups who are otherwise not engaging in any
conduct which is either illegal or a danger to themselves or to others.

The United States Supreme Court

noted this danger inherent in vague statutes in the
Papachristou case, supra.
Those generally implicated by the imprecise
terms of the ordinance--poor people,
nonconformists, dissenters, idlers--may
be required to comport themselves according
to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the
Jacksonville police and the courts. Where,
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as here, there are not standards governing
the exercise of the discretion granted by
the ordinance, the scheme permits and
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by local prosecuting officials,
against particular groups deemed to merit
their displeasure. Thornhill v. Alabama.
310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1100,
60 S. Ct. 736. It results in a regime in
which the poor and the unpopular are permitted
to "stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the
whim of any police officer." (L. Ed. at
page 120)
There are several methods Salt Lake City might
use to proscribe public intoxication which would pass
constitutional muster.

The Utah State Legislature

has set an example with its statutes prohibiting
intoxication while operating a motor vehicle.

The

Legislature has provided that when the blood alcohol
level of a driver reaches a certain point, the driver
is conclusively presumed to be intoxicated and
incapable of operating a motor vehicle.
1953, §41-6-44.

U.C.A.,

Such an objective standard of

intoxication puts all citizens and law enforcement
officers of Utah on notice of exactly what conduct
(consuming a certain, ascertainable amount of alcohol)
will be a violation of Utah Law.
It might also be appropriate for the ordinance
to provide that it is illegal to be in an intoxicated
condition in public such that one is a danger

t~

him-

self or a danger to others,or such that his conduct
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constitutes disorderly conduct.
California

For example, the

Penal Code §647 (£) provides:

Every person who conrrnits any of the following
acts shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor:

***
(f) Who is found in any public place under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, or any drug,
... or under the influence of any combination
of any intoxicating liquor, drug, toluene or
any such poison, in such a condition that he
is unable to exercise care for his safiet or
t e sa ety o ot ers, or by reason o his
being under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, or any drug, ... or under the
influence of any combination of any intoxicating
liquor, drug, toluene or any such poison,
interferes with or obstructs or revents the
an street, si ewa
Such an ordinance would put citizens, police, and
prosecutors on notice of what conduct is unlawful
which the present ordinance does not do.

VI
CONCLUSION
The criminal ordinance in dispute is a violation
of the United States Constitution.

It denies due

process to persons arrested and/or convicted under the
ordinance, for reason that the ordinance is vague on
its face.

Constitutional means exist by which Salt

Lake City might remedy the evil it has sought to
remedy by enacting the ordinance.
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The Court should declare that the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, 1965, §32-1-4 is unconstitutionally
vague on its face, and is therefore void and
unenforceable and should dismiss the charges against
the Defendant herein.

Respectfully submitted,
/;-"?
-·-·?"'~·
/·</"'

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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